INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND
The UK Government has set out ambitious targets for renewable and other forms of distributed generation, as described in the Energy White Paper [1] . It is expected that significant proportion of new and renewable generation will be connected to the distribution network, which imposes many technical and commercial challenges. One of the issues is associated with the question of the contribution that this new generation can make to distribution network security.
The former Electricity Council formulated the planning standard Engineering Recommendation (ER) P2/5 in 1978 [2] , that reflected the industry structure of the 1970s. Table 2 of the standard specifies the security contribution that could be credited to embedded generation (this generation generally being that left over from the pre-nationalised industry). Despite this, P2/5 was incorporated without revision into the statutes dealing with the privatisation of the industry and is now an inherent part of the licence of each electricity distribution network operator. Recently, a methodology for updating Table 2 of the standard has been developed to take into consideration new generation technologies [3] [4] [5] [6] . The methodology calculates the capacity of a perfect circuit, which, when substituted for the distributed generation, gives the same level of expected energy not supplied. The methodology developed can deal with both non-intermittent and intermittent generation technologies.
The next section contains the proposed procedure for assessing the system capability and shows some of the results obtained by using the developed methodology to assess the security capability of modern distributed generation presented in the Tables. In the "Numerical Examples" section the included examples serve to illustrate the procedure for assessing whether the system is compliant with the security standard.
PROCEDURE Algorithm
The overall procedure for applying the security standard is as follows:
i. Neglect generators with generation capacity less than de minimis level [5] ii. Check that the materiality conditions for the first and the second (where applicable) "circuit" outage are met. If these are met, outage of line or transformer circuits is the most critical condition, otherwise the outage of generators is the most critical condition iii. Calculate system capability as the summation of available circuits cyclic capacity, any transfer capacity, and the appropriate capability of available generation; available circuits or generation are the remaining circuits or generation after applying the critical first or second circuit outage (FCO or SCO) iv. If the required demand is less than system capability the system is compliant with security standard; otherwise not.
De minimis level. For information on de minimis level see, for example [5] .
Materiality conditions. The materiality conditions are not discussed in this paper. In addition, all examples assume that these conditions are met. Essentially, if materiality conditions are met the critical FCO and SCO are outage of lines or transformers, but not of generating units. For additional information see [5] .
System capability. The system capability is calculated for three system outage states: (i) no outage, (ii) first circuit outage, and (iii) second circuit outage. It is assumed that there is no available transfer capacity in the examples shown in this paper. Therefore, if FCO conditions are met, then conditions with no outage are also met. In order to check the FCO conditions (for satisfied materiality conditions) the system capability SC 1 is calculated as a sum of (i) total remaining transmission/distribution cyclic capacity after first circuit outage plus (ii) maximum sent-out capacity of all generation units operating 24 hours per day times capability factor for that group, plus (iii) minimum of (a) maximum sent-out capacity of all generation units operating for less than 24 hours per day times capability factor for that group, and (b) specified percentage of group demand [5] . If the system capability SC 1 is greater than group demand the FCO Compliance. It is critically important to note that the capability assessment needs to be done for each of the time periods specified in " Table 1 of P2/5". For instance, in the case of Class C, the two time periods of concern are the demand that must be recovered in 15 min and the demand that must be recovered in 3 hr. Both periods must be assessed separately since the required demand and the number of circuits and the amount of generation could be different in each of these. Compliance with revised P2/5, as in P2/5, is required for each time period. If the demand exceeds the system capability in any one-time period, the system does not satisfy the security standard. For intermittent generation, such as wind and hydro, the average winter output profile and a minimum persistence time T m is used. Persistence time is the period of time for which intermittent generation will need to operate continuously at or above a certain output level in order to support the demand and hence to provide system security. The minimum persistence time is dependent on the class of group demand and on the system conditions: switching, repair, and maintenance. An average UK winter load duration curve is used. 
Generation Capability
Times At Which Capabilities Become Available
System capabilities are evaluated independently of the point in time that they become available to support group demand. Circuit available immediately, generation delayed. This situation would occur if the circuits are operated in parallel, but all or some of the generation is either not running at the time of the outage or trip following the system fault. In this case the capabilities of the remaining circuit and of any generation that is running and does not trip is available immediately. It should be noted that P2/5 defines "immediate" restoration as one in which the interruption lasts less than one minute. However the capability of the remaining generation will not be available until the units are operating and/or those that are tripped are reconnected. Generally these would become available within the 15 min requirement specified in P2/5 for Class C demands, and therefore also for Class B demands and the second stage of Class D demands.
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Circuit delayed, generation available immediately. This situation would occur if the second circuit is connected to the system via a normally open point and the infeed requires various switching events to take place before it can pick up any demand. The generation however is assumed to be running at the time of the outage and does not trip because of the system fault. As this would necessitate islanded operation, it is normal practice to trip the generation and not reconnect it until the network is re-established. In this case, the demand cannot be supported immediately, but only after the time it takes to restore supply through the alternative network connection. This can generally be accomplished within three hours using manual switching, which is sufficient for Class B although not for Class C. In the latter case, the switching needs to be achieved remotely or automatically.
All sources delayed.
This situation is similar to that described in (c) above when the generation is deliberately tripped to avoid islanded operation.
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Numerical examples illustrate general assessment principles and effects for a range of generation. In these examples, the effect of different number and type of generating units are considered. These generating units supply group demand together with two transformers as shown in Figure 1 .
Non-intermittent Generation
Estimate system capability of system shown in Figure 1 for generating units given in If more than one type of generation exists in a demand group, as in case iii., then the capabilities must be combined. The exact way is to aggregate them using the methodology. Alternatively the individual capabilities could be arithmetically summated. The summation results are always less than those given by the aggregation approach and therefore its use would always give results that err on the side of caution. In addition, the difference between the two values is generally small particularly as the number of units is increased. Since the aggregation approach increases the degree of precision and not necessarily the degree of accuracy, these results indicate that, provided the number of separate groups is relatively small, the simplicity of the summation approach justifies its use for evaluating the security capability of groups having non-identical units.
Intermittent generation
Although intermittent generation such as wind farms make little contribution for extended periods, these sources could provide significant support for short periods. One instance is when manual switching may take a period of say 3 hr after which the network itself is sufficient to satisfy a revised P2/5. In the period up to 3hr however the remaining circuit together with a wind farm may be able to provide sufficient security to ii. effective generation capability (MW) 2.4 1.4
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iii. capacity to meet demand after FCO (MW) 58.0 57.0
The system could usually be expected to support a maximum demand of 58.0 MW during 3hr period, and 57.0 MW during 18hr period.
Non-intermittent and Intermittent Generation
The following approach is again an approximation using the tabulated values and summating. The result is a pessimistic value. A more accurate approach would be to treat it as a special case and use the analysis package [5] . The system is shown in Figure 1 and consists of, in addition to the transformers, two non-intermittent units: for each unit DNC is 20 MW and availability is 90%, and one wind farm of 10 MW. The capability of non-intermittent units is 69% (TABLE 3) , and of wind farm is 24% (TABLE 4) for T m = 3 hours.
Step 1 Step 2: Examine SCO conditions. From Table 1 of P2/5, no SCO condition applies for demands less than 100 MW.
Step 3: Conclusion. The system could usually be expected to support a maximum demand of 85.6 MW.
Additional Contribution from Two (<24hr) Units
This example considers the case of non-intermittent generation.
Data: DNC of each unit = 20MW unit availability = 90% capability (24hr) = 69% operating time = 12hr per day capability (<24hr)= 12% of group demand or 14% of "firm" capacity 1
Step 1: Examine FCO conditions. i. remaining circuit capacity following outage of the most critical circuit = 1 x 45 x 1.3 x 0.95 = 55.6 MW ii. effective capability of generation is smaller of 0.69 x (2 x 20) = 27.6 MW or 0.14 x 55.6 = 7.8 MW iii. capacity to meet demand after FCO = 55.6 + 7.8 = 63.4 MW
Step 2: Examine SCO conditions. From Table 1 of P2/5, no SCO condition applies for demands less than 100 MW.
Step 3: Conclusion. The system could usually be expected to support a maximum demand of 63.4 MW.
Systems with (24hr) and (<24hr) Generation
Data: 2 units operate for 24hr per day 2 units operate for 12hr per day DNC of each unit = 10MW unit availability = 90% capability (24hr) = 69% capability (12hr) = 12% of group demand or 14% of "firm" capacity
Step 1 Step 2: Examine SCO conditions. From Table 1 of P2/5, no SCO condition applies for demands less than 100MW.
Step 3: Conclusion. The system could usually be expected to support a maximum demand of 79.1 MW.
Systems Requiring Consideration of Second Circuit Outages
An example for which the group demand that can be supported is greater than 100 MW. This example considers non-intermittent generation. A similar procedure would be used for intermittent generation. In this example, a third circuit is added to the previous two giving the system shown in Figure 2 . Step 2: Examine SCO conditions. From Table 1 of P2/5, the smaller of ( 1 / 3 of group demand) and (group demand minus 100 MW) must be supplied within 3 hr of a double circuit outage if group demand exceeds 100 MW. If group demand were to be 141.2 MW (as in iii. above), then the remaining circuit and the generation would be required to supply the smaller of ( 1 / 3 of group demand = 47.1 MW) and (141.2 -100 = 41.2 MW) within three hours. The effective contribution of the remaining circuit and the generation is 85.6 MW and is thus well able to meet the SCO requirement.
Step 3: Conclusion. The system could usually be expected to support a maximum demand of 141.2 MW.
It should be noted that this level of maximum demand exceeds the continuous rating capability of the three circuits. This is compatible with both ACE Report 51 [8] and P2/5. However, although this means the system satisfies P2/5 (and revised P2/5) compliant for a group demand of 141.2 MW, other system technical features may cause the actual demand to be supplied to be less than this value. This is outside the scope of this paper and also outside the scope of revised P2/5.
CONCLUSION
The proposed procedure presented in this paper summarises the procedure for assessing whether the supply to a particular group demand satisfies the revised security standard. The procedure is based on that underpinning the existing standard P2/5 but modified in order to include modern type of generation. Tables presented in this paper are being proposed as the basis of the revised P2/5, i.e. the basis of the new security standard. The examples included in this paper serve to illustrate the procedure for assessing whether the system satisfies revised security standard.
In cases where more than one type of generation exists in a demand group it is suggested that the summation approach be used for most case studies and that the aggregation approach be used only for those cases in which greater precision is deemed necessary, or the number and diversity of the groups give cause for concern about whether the summation approach is sufficiently precise.
